Botnet detection, vulnerability mining and confrontation bring many challenges to network security, and become the main dangerous source threatening economic development and causing significant economic losses. To solve these problems, we combine machine learning with classification mining, and propose a botnet vulnerability mining and countermeasure algorithm and its system. Firstly, a botnet model based on machine learning and its construction method are designed according to the characteristics of Botnet such as group network attack, computer group controlled and distributed denial of service attack. Then, in order to achieve the global optimal evaluation and screening of Botnet detection by network vulnerability mining system, a network vulnerability combination classification mining algorithm and machine learning instruction set are designed. Then, based on the analysis of the vulnerability form and the vulnerability diffusion mode of botnet, a vulnerability mining and confrontation algorithm for botnet is proposed. Finally, through simulation experiments, the advantages of the proposed algorithm are proved in vulnerability identification rate, vulnerability clearance performance and botnet connectivity. For example, the average vulnerability detection rate is more than 87%, the vulnerability repair rate is higher than 86%, and the pass rate is still higher than 89%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Worms, Trojans, backdoor tools [1] and other network attacks can be widely spread [2] and spread through botnets. Botnet has become the integration platform of various network attack schemes and one of the main forms of complex network attack. Botnets have gradually become the main means of intrusion into cyberspace, and have the characteristics [3] of great non-cooperative awareness, concealment of user terminals and difficulty in capturing network vulnerabilities. How to regard botnet as a kind of pervasive malicious attack code [4] , reduce its infection scope, reduce its destructive power and mechanism complexity [5] , to improve the flexibility [6] of network vulnerability mining and countermeasure mechanism, has become a huge challenge faced by traditional security defense methods.
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About vulnerability classification and clustering, a clustering technique is introduced that removes some of the subjectivity associated with the indexing method in article [7] . It could be found that Grey Analytic Hierarchy Process method combines the advantages of classical analytic hierarchy process and grey clustering method for accurate estimation of weight coefficients [8] . the researches of article [9] explored the application of classification and clustering approaches for pattern recognition and failure forecasting on mining shovels. The article [10] illustrated the use of an additive main effects and multiplicative interaction model, instead of the conventional saturated interaction model. The article [11] present Monte Carlo simulations that evaluate size and power of the proposed tests under different scenarios.
About countermeasure and machine learning, the machine learning algorithm of article [12] could be used to find out the best hamming distance redistribution mapping by using neural dynamic programming. Safavi et al. [13] researched the fraud detection in voice-based identity VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ authentication applications and services. In article [14] , based on maximum entropy clustering, two specialized criteriainter-view collaborative learning and intra-view weighted attributes are first devised as the bases. The authors of article [15] proposed an effective anti-forensic attack for environmental-signature-based splicing detection method and countermeasures to detect the presence of the antiforensic attack. A dynamic classifier selection method for constructing efficient one-class ensembles was presented in article [16] .The presented work of [17] investigated the use of Resting state functional network connectivity for mild Traumatic brain injury detection compared to diffusion magnetic resonance imaging results on the same cohort. The work of [18] presented two new hypotheses for feature extraction to detect offensive comments directed towards peers which are perceived more negatively and result in cyberbullying. A performance monitoring and failure prediction method was proposed in optical networks based on machine learning [19] . The Markov Decision Process and Bayesian learning method are applied to the NP-hard problem to dynamically allocate cloud resources for NFV components [20] . The [21] provided an overview for data mining for security applications and then discussed our research to the botnet problem which follows from an important observation that botnet traffic is a continuous flow of data stream. The reasons were examined in [22] for creating such videos grounded in the literature from cultural anthropology, transnationalism and religious identity, and media and communication. A malicious infrastructure was demonstrated in [23] through extensive large-scale simulation based on publicly available Bluetooth traces, which is possible in many areas due to the largely repetitive nature of human daily routines.The authors of [24] presented that the auxiliary information, such as user social engagements on social media should be involved to help make a determination of fake news detection on social media.
The [25] researched a cost-driven services composition in an Uncertain Environment. The [26] classified the botnet detection techniques into four classes: signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based, and mining-base and summarized botnet detection techniques in each class and provides a brief comparison of botnet detection techniques. The [27] critically reviewed the graph based detection methods suitable for edge router monitoring using two types of real network traces. Based on the emotional recognition data sample set collected in the initialization stage, the [28] developed a real-time and reliable data collection system for big scale emotional recognition systems by considering the dynamic migration of data. The [29] used the repeatability standard deviation method to detect the connection of Botnets within HTTP protocol.
However, the above research has ignored the research on the cooperation between vulnerability classification, clustering, mining in Botnet countermeasure. Therefore, in view of the above shortcomings, we proposed the Botnet vulnerability clustering classification mining and countermeasure algorithm based on machine learning.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the scheme of Botnet Model Based on Machine Learning. Section III shows the Classified Mining Algorithms for Network Vulnerability Combination. Section IV indicates the Botnet Vulnerability Mining and Countermeasure Algorithms. Section V perform the simulation analysis, followed by the conclusion in Section VI.
II. BOTNET MODEL BASED ON MACHINE LEARNING
Botnet has the characteristics of group network attack, computer group controlled, distributed denial of service attack and large data sensitive information stealing. How to train and process these data is the key to monitor botnet. We present a botnet model based on machine learning.
In this model, three components of training data x i are defined, the density m k of clustering c j to which training data x i belongs, and the distance d p from clustering c j to neighbor clustering with the highest approximation and their approximation. The distance d p of these three components is the core, which can directly determine the density m k and approximation. The construction process of the botnet model is described as follows.
In the first stage, the density m k of cluster c j belongs to training data x i .
Given an arbitrary data set, set its dimension to M. Calculate the distance and density between each data sample and clustering core, such as formula (1) .
Here, d X represents the average distance between data elements of data set X and clustering core. Parameter ts d denotes the clustering core of data set X and the density of data samples with the highest approximation. Parameter β is a constant, representing the core fitness of clustering.
Therefore, the largest data point x i of d X is selected from data set X, and the density m k of the clustering can be obtained by combining formula (2) .
Here, by comparing the relationship
the best clustering density of data set X can be determined.
In the second stage, the neighbor clustering distance with the highest approximation is identified according to the clustering density and the clustering kernel distributed distance.
The approximation of the data set can be identified with the clustering density m k and the core-like distributed distance d X . Data points with high approximation will be reclassified. Neighbor clustering with the highest approximation degree could be guaranteed and its clustering identification are traversed from the new classification. Thus, we can identify the distance of neighbor clustering with the highest approximation according to the clustering density and the clustering kernel distributed distance, and get the machine learning neighbor clustering graph and its 3D topology as shown in FIGURE 1. In FIGURE 1 , the X-axis is the clustering density and the Y-axis is the distance of neighbor clustering. Each data point is displayed on the corresponding coordinate position in the cluster graph of machine learning neighbors according to the distributed distance of the clustering core, which serves as the basis for identifying the highest approximation. In FIGURE 1, we can see that clustering core points of two homogeneous data have high local approximation and optimal distributed distance from the core (shown as light blue spheres). These machine learning training decision points are selected as candidate neighbor clustering of the current data set. The two clustering core points represented by light grey do not have the best distance from the core and high approximation. These points are identified as Hyperdimensional data points whose dimension values are much larger than M, and are deleted from candidate clusters. In addition, the threedimensional topology of Figure 1 is presented in 3-D form in with that in FIGURE 1. The combination of FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 is helpful for screening outlier data samples which are neither clustering core nor candidate neighbor clustering core. These data points will be thoroughly cleared before the start of the third phase.
In the third stage, neighbor clustering and its approximation are confirmed.
The data samples of machine learning training are classified into the nearest clustering according to the approximation degree, and mapped to the neighbor clustering core. After the exception data samples are cleared, we can map each data point in the clustering topology of Figure 1 to the neighbor clustering with the highest approximation and the clustering density stopping increasing. For each identified data point x i , the neighbor clustering set whose clustering density stops increasing is defined as CC (x i ). By the distance matrix DD from the core, we can find the highest approximation of the clustering of x i and its neighbors in the CC (x i ) set. If the neighbor clustering of Xi map is out of balance with the clustering with the highest approximation, the clustering density of x i is directly reduced by half, and the adjacent data samples of x i are allocated to the neighbor clustering with the highest density. Otherwise, the first stage will be re-executed.
Repeat these three stages until all machine learning data samples are assigned to clusters with the highest approximation and density. So far, the group building process of machine learning data sample set is completed. The evolutionary process of these three stages is shown in FIGURE 3. After clustering and distributed processing of the machine learning data samples shown in FIGURE 3, the available data samples of each cluster present a high-density clustering feature. However, there are some differences between the range of group characteristics of these machine learning-based data clustering and that of botnets. If vulnerability detection is VOLUME 7, 2019 carried out by using the group characteristic value of Botnet calculated by machine learning directly, the detection accuracy may be reduced and the vulnerability misjudged, thus the actual characteristics of Botnet can not be accurately reflected. Therefore, on the basis of dense processing of machine learning data, linear transformation of clustered and distributed data is carried out by using distance and density fitting method, as shown in formula (3).
Among them, the core fitting degree beta of clustering appears to weaken the approximation deviation between data set X and data point x i . Because the value of a feature of x i is the mean value of the clustering core after distributed processing, it may deviate greatly from the minimum and maximum value of the feature of X after K iterations.
To sum up, the process of building the botnet model based on machine learning is as follows:
The first step is to cluster large data samples of botnet. Initialize a series of clustering cores. Random selection of a data point from these cores is the first distributed standard.
Step 2 calculates and initializes the distance between the core data points and other core points.
The third step is to set up a binary set of core points and distances and add them to the feature set of botnet.
Step 4 calculates the distance from each object to all cluster centers in the cluster center set, records the shortest distance among them, and adds it to the distance set.
Step 5finds the maximum distance in the set.
Step 6 calculates the clustering density of training data points according to the formula.
Step 7 identifies the neighbor clustering distance with the highest approximation according to the clustering density and the clustering kernel distributed distance.
Step 8 confirm the neighbor clustering and its approximation.
Step 9 repeat steps 6 to 8 until the botnet large data set is no longer separated and aggregated.
In order to quantify the data aggregation approximation analysis of the above botnet model, it is necessary to calculate the approximation weight of each botnet data clustering. Because the botnet features in the same botnet have group similarity, botnets need to learn clustering and separation through multiple iterations to form a high density and high approximation botnet large data confluence sample set. Such a botnet model can obtain real-time vulnerability detection data sets with small distances and fewer merging iterations.
The above construction algorithm is described as follows: (1) We use the random forest similarity detection algorithm [30] . Its running time is O(NMD), where N is the number of data samples i.e., x i , M is the scale of feature and D is the tree height of this random forest. (2) We usethe noisy binary search algorithm [31] to find the maximum value. Its running time is O( log 2 N ).
Above all, the running time of Algorithm 1 is
O( |x i | |m k | )O(NMD) + O(k |x i |) + O(l(|x i | + |m k | )) + O( |x i | |d X | ) ≈ O(k |x i | )O(NMD) ≤ O(kN 2 ).
III. CLASSIFIED MINING ALGORITHMS FOR NETWORK VULNERABILITY COMBINATION
Section II gives the botnet model and its construction method. This model establishes a good data preprocessing for network vulnerability mining. Next, we design a botnet vulnerability mining system, and further exploit the processing advantages of machine learning data set in section II. The network vulnerability mining system can give the global optimal evaluation and screening case for botnet detection. These evaluation and screening cases can effectively monitor network vulnerabilities and select the best real-time vulnerability classification and test cases. The design of Botnet vulnerability mining system is shown in FIGURE 4 . The input end of the system evaluates and filters the training data samples of machine learning and forwards them to the detection module. The use case of the detection module is generated in real time by the adaptive evolution module and sent to Multi-Vulnerability Target Application. Then, the core server implements vulnerability combination classification algorithm and network process monitoring module, to obtain the real-time status of the botnet vulnerability testing target. Then, according to the vulnerability classification, by mapping to machine learning instruction set module, the proposed scheme could select the best combination of instructions, and mine botnet vulnerabilities. The mining algorithm filters the test cases and classification vulnerabilities generated by the previous process with high matching approximation degree, which can greatly improve the efficiency of vulnerability mining for dynamic covert botnet, and ensure the validity of real-time updating and filtering of machine learning training data.
Unlike the classical botnet protocol vulnerability detection, the botnet vulnerability mining system shown in FIGURE 4 can not only realize the self-detection and preprocessing of data sets, but also carry out in-depth mining of machine learning according to the network vulnerabilities that have been excavated. In addition, the machine learning instruction set contained in the adaptive evolution module in FIGURE 4 is shown in TABLE 1. According to the data preprocessing results of machine learning, the module selects the best instruction set needed for current vulnerability mining from TABLE 1. 
FIGURE 5 shows an actual machine learning instruction set use case of the botnet vulnerability classification mining system supported by machine learning shown in FIGURE 4. We can see the logical mapping and linear correlation between instructions in the instruction set shown in TABLE 1.
The instruction set instance pseudocode shown in FIGURE 5 is shown below.
Let the Fuzzy Detection Value in Algorithm 2 be FD, which includes fragmented botnet data samples, repeated botnet vulnerabilities, unrelated botnet status, unsatisfactory data sample sets and other vulnerability detection failures. If the instruction set vector of Botnet Classification Vulnerability Mining is P, then the vector P can be expressed in the VOLUME 7, 2019 following form,
where p i represents the value that may cause the failure of vulnerability detection in the first data set. This value can be obtained by the matrix dot product operation between the distance vector from the core and the optimal density of each cluster. In Check module, we can convert some eigenvalues of vector P into a new machine learning vulnerability mining training set for network vulnerability mining system, such as the probability of causing detection failure, the location of the failed data point, the characteristics of repeated network vulnerabilities and the storage mode of network vulnerability detection results. 
IV. BOTNET VULNERABILITY MINING AND COUNTERMEASURE ALGORITHMS
Generally speaking, the vulnerability form and vulnerability diffusion of Botnet is the core of the whole botnet, and also the key point of exploiting and confronting the vulnerabilities of botnet. The formalization and discretization of vulnerabilities are as follows:
(1) Formal description of vulnerabilities in botnets and command control of vulnerability detection are often difficult to match. The main reason is that these vulnerabilities are upgraded from infected network nodes and spread through infected network servers. In addition, vulnerability commands of these botnet nodes can easily be disguised as normal network push commands or network mail codes, which can be spread to other nodes, wireless physical layer protocols and so on. These infected objects, including network nodes, service software, service protocols and control commands, may become the carrier of vulnerability proliferation.
(2) When exploring and classifying the vulnerabilities of botnets, how to eliminate the concealment of the vulnerabilities and avoid the vulnerabilities being migrated quickly through normal channels becomes the primary problem in the botnet vulnerability confrontation if the vulnerabilities caused by domain name forgery and tampering are encountered.
(3) The data and commands generated by botnets are highly discrete, which makes it difficult for the botnet countermeasure algorithm to capture the botnet's topology. Because botnet topologies are often disguised as commands or control processes. In the highly discrete botnet system, it is necessary to quickly find the core commands of the network and the most seriously infected control server, and then use the network node peer-to-peer communication mode to weaken the importance of the server to the common network node, so as to extend the vulnerability countermeasure load to the whole network platform by complementary way, and improve the feasibility of countering botnet. However, how to distribute the vulnerability countermeasure load to the whole botnet topology and find the fragile link of the botnet. And to combat the spread of vulnerabilities on these links.
Based on the above analysis in section III and the vulnerability classification and mining, we design a series of vulnerability commands to discover and exploit hidden vulnerabilities and camouflage of botnet, so as to achieve effective botnet confrontation. FIGURE 6 shows the logic of counteracting hidden vulnerabilities and disguised vulnerability commands, and deploys a communication server with section II description of vulnerabilities and classified mining functions in the wireless base station communication area. The communication server identifies and counteracts hidden vulnerabilities and disguised vulnerabilities commands as follows: (1) To detect and screen all nodes of botnet, mark botnet hosts with vulnerabilities, and give infection evaluation report. According to vulnerability categories, specific forwarding base stations are allocated.
(2) Through different transfer stations and their communication protocol settings, read the classified botnet host's hidden vulnerability form and camouflage botnet command code, and forward it to the communication server and its upper data storage server.
(3) Using machine learning module, we can quickly locate the diffusion model of Botnet vulnerabilities.
(4) According to the diffusion model of Botnet vulnerabilities and the discrete network data flow, upgrade the hardware and software of the botnet node, remove all the infected records and backups, and forward them to the communication server.
(5)Select the best botnet vulnerabilities against machine learning instruction set according to TABLE 1 again, and send the instruction set information back to the botnet data storage server.
(6)Pairs of marked botnet target hosts are marked as confrontation state again.
(8)According to the vulnerability categories and diffusion assessment of botnets, different levels of countermeasures are implemented, and the effectiveness of countermeasures is monitored in real time. The state of the opposed botnet is periodically fed back to the machine learning training set storage server, which facilitates the training of machine learning to achieve data consistency and robustness at the server level.
In order to more concisely and clearly illustrate the communication server's command recognition and countermeasure algorithm for concealed vulnerabilities and camouflage vulnerabilities, we define a random extended finite state machine. The state machine consists of a quaternion <d X , m k , B N , M L >, in which d X is a finite set of machine-learned botnet states; m k is the initial density state of section II's botnet model; BN is the data set of Botnet input; ML is the output data set of machine learning opportunity d X training. A state transition variable d T is defined between d X and m k . Establish a migration mapping set t D between BN and ML. For any botnet or server or botnet relay in BN, the termination state arrives after several iterations under the migration of d T . When in a state of the finite state machine, a state transition rule is obeyed between an input and an output. The state transition of Botnet mainframe maintains local consistency with the state of Botnet vulnerability detection machine.
The core of FIGURE 7 is a botnet, represented by a double-ring ellipse. The database of Botnet vulnerabilities should be established on the transit station, and a pointer should be defined. This pointer is used to assign an initial value to the list of Botnet vulnerabilities. For this list, the head and tail pointers point to all infected nodes in the botnet. A queue is defined to mark the state transition process of infected botnet nodes. If the botnet vulnerability classification and mining algorithm generates new nodes, the new nodes can be stored at the end of the queue. When the queue is empty, it indicates that the botnet state migration is over and the confrontation is successful.
When the length of the queue does not increase, all nodes of the botnet are identified. In summary, botnet vulnerability mining and countermeasure algorithms are described as follows.
The BNN generated by the above algorithm can capture the real-time data set of the botnet and merge it into each botnet to assign counterweight. Therefore, for the BNN matrix combined with the Botnet Finite State Machine migration strategy, the BNN matrix representation is shown in Formula 5.
V. SIMULATION EVALUATION
In order to verify and analyze the performance of the three core algorithms proposed in this paper, namely, the botnet model based on machine learning and its construction algorithm, the botnet vulnerability combination classification mining algorithm and the botnet vulnerability mining and countermeasure algorithm, which are recorded as BVCC-ML, we designed three groups of simulation experiments respectively. Hole recognition rate, vulnerability clearance performance and botnet connectivity are verified.
The experimental data sets are free botnet data sets. The data set consists of abnormal samples and normal samples. Abnormal data samples come from the French honeypot project, including many famous botnets such as storm, waledac and zeus. These botnets implement all kinds of communication based on P2P protocol.
All kinds of algorithms proposed in this paper are realized by mixed programming of MATLAB and C++. In the three groups of experiments, about 2.5 million feature vectors were extracted from the experimental data sets, and the data sets of [5%, [11%] were randomly extracted as training data samples of machine learning. At the same time, the data sets of [15%, [25%] were randomly extracted as test cases. The number of Botnet nodes increases from 10 to 100. The parameters of the experimental platform are detailed in TABLE 2. In the first group of experiments, 10 to 20 attacks were randomly generated in botnets, and corresponding network vulnerabilities were formed. The proposed algorithm BVCC-ML is used for vulnerability detection to verify the feasibility of the proposed botnet model based on machine learning, i.e. vulnerability detection. FIGURE 8 shows the comparison between the number of experimental statistical vulnerabilities and the number of vulnerabilities detected by the proposed algorithm BVCC-ML. The abscissa is the attack sequence and the ordinate is the number of the network vulnerability identification. From FIGURE 8 , we can see that the average vulnerability detection rate of the proposed BVCC-ML algorithm is more than 87%, the best state can reach 100%, and the worst case is not less than 84%. Such high-precision vulnerability detection benefits from the three-stage processing scheme of machine learning and the clustering and distributed processing of machine learning data samples shown in FIGURE 3. In the second group of experiments, aiming at the multiple vulnerabilities identified by the first group of experiments, the proposed BVCC-ML network vulnerability combination classification mining algorithm is used to remove and repair the vulnerabilities in real time. FIGURE 9 shows the effect of network vulnerability clearance and repair, i.e. the number of vulnerabilities detected in real time. The abscissa of FIGURE 9 is the attack sequence, and the ordinate is the number of vulnerabilities. By comparing the results of , we find that the input of the vulnerability mining system designed by the proposed algorithm filters the training data samples of machine learning into data sets, and realizes the application of adaptive evolution and real-time multivulnerability target mining through detection cases. In addition, the core server of the system implements vulnerability combination classification algorithm and network process monitoring module to repair the status of the botnet vulnerability test target in real time. Therefore, the percentage of vulnerabilities repaired per time is higher than 86%.
The third group of experiments focuses on the verification and analysis of Botnet connectivity. During the experiment, real-time statistics show that the connectivity of Botnet increases with the number of Botnet nodes. Fig. 10 shows the experimental results. The abscissa is the number of Botnet nodes, and the ordinate is the botnet connectivity. Analysis of FIGURE 10 and 11 show that the proposed algorithm BVCC-ML botnet vulnerability mining and countermeasure algorithm performs well. In addition to the initial state, that is, the connection rate of Botnet nodes less than 15 is less than 62%, in other cases, it is higher than 91%. Especially, with the increase of the number of Botnet nodes, the detection of network vulnerabilities, the difficulty of mining and repairing network vulnerabilities significantly increased, resulting in a decline in confrontation effect, but the connectivity rate is still higher than 89%. This is due to the good performance of the communication server designed by the proposed algorithm in steps 4, 5 and 6 of identifying and counteracting hidden vulnerabilities and disguised vulnerability commands.
VI. CONCLUSION
Aiming at the detection, vulnerability mining and confrontation of botnet, combined with machine learning and classification mining, this paper designs a botnet vulnerability mining and confrontation system and its three core algorithms, which are botnet model and construction algorithm based on machine learning, network vulnerability combination classification mining algorithm and botnet vulnerability mining and confrontation algorithm. Among them, based on machine learning, a botnet model is constructed according to the clustering density and the distance between neighbors with the highest approximation of clustering core and distributed distance. By realizing the global optimal evaluation of Botnet detection by the network vulnerability mining system, the network vulnerability combination classification mining algorithm and the algorithm can effectively monitor network vulnerabilities, and select the best real-time vulnerability classification. And test cases, build a botnet vulnerability mining system. Based on the consistency and robustness of training data set and server-level data of machine learning, an algorithm for identifying and counteracting hidden vulnerabilities and disguised vulnerabilities in communication servers is designed. The simulation experiments prove the superiority of the proposed algorithm from three aspects: vulnerability recognition rate (average value is more than 87%) vulnerability clearance performance (vulnerability repair ratio is higher than 86%) and botnet connectivity (higher than 89%). 
